Free check rhc 1.0 software for linux

check_dir is a Nagios plugin to check the number of files in one or more directories.
Usage:
usage:
-d dirname directory
-r recursive
-c crit critical
-w warn warning
-v verbose
Enhancements:
- The unkown tag was added.
- Missing directories are now reported.

check_apc_pdu application can check load and outlet status of a APC PDU by snmp.

Usage:

usage:
-H (--hostname) Hostname to query - (required)
-C (--community) SNMP read community (defaults to public,
used with SNMP v1 and v2c
-v (--snmp_version) 1 for SNMP v1 (default)
2 for SNMP v2c
SNMP v2c will use get_bulk for less overhead
3 for SNMPv3 (requires -U option)
-p (--port) SNMP port (default 161)
-o (--on) Outlets (name or number) must be on
-O (--off) Outlets (name or number) must be off
-L (--seclevel) choice of "noAuthNoPriv", "authNoPriv", or "authPriv"
-U (--secname) username for SNMPv3 context
-c (--context) SNMPv3 context name (default is empty string)
-A (--authpass) authentication password (cleartext ascii or localized key
in hex with 0x prefix generated by using "snmpkey" utility
auth password and authEngineID
-a (--authproto) Authentication protocol ( MD5 or SHA1)
-X (--privpass) privacy password (cleartext ascii or localized key
in hex with 0x prefix generated by using "snmpkey" utility
privacy password and authEngineID
-M (--maxmsgsize) Max message size - usefull only for v1 or v2c
-t (--timeout) seconds before the plugin times out (default=15)
-V (--version) Plugin version
-h (--help) usage help

Integcheck is a system integrity checker.
Integcheck checks the integrity of exposed systems by getting a list of MD5 hashes of any important file via SSH.
The idea is to check integrity of exposed systems by getting a list of md5 of any important file via ssh, to keep this list on a pretty safe system (a system that do not run any server publicly available), and, finally, to compare everyday this list and with the previous one.
As long as the system considered as safe is not compromised, it should inform administrators of any changes on the others systems.
As others integrity checker, if its own components are corrupted, it can be fooled. In others words, you cannot have a security policy entirely relying on an integrity checker, and you should always do manual checks regularly to be sure that the integrity checker is not corrupted itself.
So whats the point of this tool, if you are still forced to do manual checks? In fact, it is way faster to check integrity of integcheck than integrity of the whole system.
Enhancements:
- Checks now rely on MD5 and file size instead of just MD5.

Check Your Network Address Translator for Compatibility with Peer-to-Peer Protocols.
If you are accessing the Internet from behind a Network Address Translator (NAT) of some kind, I would appreciate your help in surveying the behavior of different NATs, in terms of how and whether they support a certain technique for enabling peer-to-peer communication between NATted hosts (particularly when both endpoints are behind NATs). Down, you can understand what NAT is.
Suppose there are three communicating hosts: A, B, and C. Host A is a "well-known" Internet server with a permanent IP address, which acts as an "introducer" for the other two nodes. (For example, Host A might be a well-known ultrapeer or a game catalog server of some kind.) Host B, using Host As "introduction" services, would like to establish a direct peer-to-peer connection with host C. Both B and C, however, are behind (probably different) network address/port translators, and neither of them has exclusive use of any public IP address.
To initiate a peer-to-peer connection with host C, host B first sends A a message requesting an "introduction" to host C. A sends B a reply message containing Cs IP address and UDP port number as reported by host C, in addition to Cs IP address and UDP port number as observed by A. (If C is behind a NAT, then these two address/port combinations will be different.) At the same time, host A sends host C a message containing Bs IP address and UDP port numbers - again, both the ones reported by B and the ones observed by A, which will be different if B is behind a NAT.
Now B and C each know that they want to initiate a connection with each other, and they know each others public (NATted) as well as original IP addresses and UDP port numbers. Both B and C now start attempting to send UDP messages directly to each other, at each of the available addresses. If B and C happen to be behind the same NAT, then they will be able to communicate with each other directly using their "originally reported" IP addresses and UDP port numbers.
In the more common case where B and C are behind different NATs, the "originally reported" addresses will be useless because they will both be private IP addresses in different addressing domains. Instead, the IP address/UDP port combinations observed by A can be used in this case to establish direct communication. Although Bs NAT will initially filter out any UDP packets arriving from Cs public (NATted) UDP port directed at Bs public port, the first UDP message B sends to C will cause Bs NAT to open up a new UDP session keyed on Cs public port, allowing future incoming traffic from C to pass through the NAT to B. Similarly, the first few messages from B to C may be filtered out by Cs NAT, but will be able to start passing through the firewall as soon as Cs first message to B causes Cs NAT to open up a new session. In this way, each NAT is tricked into thinking that its respective internal host is the "initiator" of this new session, when in fact the session is fully symmetrical and was initiated (with As help) simultaneously in each direction.
Required NAT Behavior
There is one important requirement that the NATs must satisfy in order for this technique to work: the NATs must be designed so that they assign only one (public IP address, public UDP port) pair to each (internal IP address, internal UDP port) combination, rather than allocating and assigning a new public UDP port for each new UDP session. Recall that a "session" in Internet terminology is defined by the IP addresses and port numbers of both communicating endpoints, so host Bs communication with host A is considered to be one session while host Bs communication with host C is a different session. If Bs NAT, for example, assigns one public UDP port for Bs communication with A, and then assigns B a different public UDP port for the new session B tries to open up with C, then the above technique for peer-to-peer communication will not work because Cs messages to B will be directed to the wrong UDP port.
RFC 3022 explicitly allows and suggests that NATs behave in the former, "desirable" fashion, by maintaining a single (public IP, public port) mapping for a given (internal IP, internal port) combination independent of the number of active sessions involving this mapping. This behavior is not only good for compatibility with UDP applications, but it also helps to conserve the NATs scarce pool of public port numbers. Maintaining a consistent public port mapping does not adversely affect security in any way, either, because incoming traffic can still be filtered on a per-session basis regardless of how addresses are translated. There in fact appears to be no good reason not to implement the desirable behavior in a NAT, except perhaps for the implementation simplicity of naively allocating a new public port for every new session. Unfortunately, RFC 3022 does not require NATs to implement the desirable behavior, which has led me to wonder just how many real NATs actually do, and hence this page.
What NAT Check Does
The program natcheck.c is basically just a program that "pings" a well-known UDP port at two different servers that are publically accessible on the Internet. Both of these servers run the program natserver.c, with the command-line arguments "1" and "2" respectively. In addition, there a third "conspiring" server runs natserver with the command-line argument "3". Whenever each of the first two servers receives a UDP request, it not only sends a reply directly to the sender of that request, but also sends a message to the third server, which in turn "bounces" the reply back to the original client. The effect is that the client will receive not only solicited "ping" replies from the server the request was directed to, but also "unsolicited" replies from the third server.
To determine if the network address translator in use is implementing the desirable behavior of maintaining a single (public IP address, public port) mapping for a given (client IP address, client port), the client program natcheck.c basically just initiates a sequence of simultaneous pings to the first two servers (in case some of the requests or replies are lost in transit) and checks that the clients address and UDP port as reported by both servers is the same. If the NAT naively allocates a new public port for each new session, then the source port as reported by the two servers will be different, and its time to upgrade your NAT.
The replies echoed from the third server are used only to check whether the NAT properly filters out unsolicited incoming traffic on a per-session basis. Since the client never sends any messages to the third server, if the NAT is properly implementing firewall functionality, the client should never see the third servers echoed replies even after opening up active communication sessions with the first two servers.
Enhancements:
- The NAT Check client no longer attempts to guess whether you have Basic NAT or Network Address/Port Translation (NAPT). It turns to be quite difficult to test for this property reliably, because many NAPTs attempt to bind a private UDP port to a public port with the same port number if that port number is available, causing NAT Check to falsely report Basic NAT. The only way to test for this property reliably would be to run NAT Check on at least two client machines simultaneously, and since this property isnt terribly important to P2P apps its just not worth the trouble.
- The NAT Check client now tests for one additional NAT feature, which I call loopback translation. If a NAT supports loopback translation, it means that a host on the private network behind the NAT can communicate with other hosts on the same private network using public (translated) port bindings assigned by the NAT. Most NATs probably do not support this feature yet, but it may become increasingly important in the future where P2P clients may be located behind a common ISP-deployed NAT as well as individual home NATs. More details on loopback translation will appear in the next version of my Internet-Draft, to be released soon.
- The NAT Check client program now has a command-line option, "-v", which turns on verbose messages during the test.

Bandwidth Check is a small utility that helps an administrator measure the available bandwidth. In order to make use of this utility, you will need to turn on the chargen service, which is provided in many inetd implementations.

In order to make use of this utility, you will need to turn on chargen protocol.

To enable chargen on Linux:

create the following file /etc/xinetd.d/charge
service chargen
{
type = INTERNAL
id = chargen-stream
socket_type = stream
protocol = tcp
user = root
wait = no
disable = no
}
service xinetd restart

To Compile bwcheck

gcc -o bwcheck bwcheck.c

To execute

./bwcheck

./bwcheck 172.16.11.2
Throughput: 73390.74 kb

pppcheck can help you to check usage of shared ppp accounts and limit ppp users by hrs/day and hrs/month.

iScholar project is a content-neutral authoring and publishing system that can be used to write on-line or paper & pen exams and course pages on virtually any topic.
iScholar is ideally suited to deliver or supplement the courses and curriculum of
- Professional Training Programs
- Corporate Training Programs
- Distance Education and Continuing Education
- University Courses
- Grade School or High School Classes
Main features:
Standard Features
- WYSIWYG interface for creating and editing exams
- Print feature lets you print pen & paper versions of on-line exams
Supports many question types including:
- multiple choice, multiple answer, true/false, drop-down
- Fill in the blank, Essay, Number Check, Range Check,
- Expression Check, Function Check
Other Features
- Automated marking
- Hints & Hint Penalties
- Multiple Attempts & Attempt penalties
- Timed Exams
- Test and Exam Certifications
- Questions can include images and audio/video elements.
- Question content can be written in HTML, LaTeX (for equations and math symbols) or plain Text
- Grouping of exams and course pages into modules with prerequisites and anti-requisites